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Abstract 
In the post-Cold-War era domestic interim governance (‘DIG’) has become a matter of international 
interest. DIG is observed by provisional governments, transitional councils, etc. (‘domestic transitional 
authorities’) in countries said to be in transition. The so-called international community increasingly 
relies on DIG, which has become a recurrent politico-legal reality today. This paper unveils the 
reasons behind the success of DIG, observes how DIG is increasingly being internationalized, 
questions the legal rationales that may be invoked in support of DIG, and ends with discussing the 
paradoxes underlying DIG. The paper argues that a comprehensive analysis of how international law 
applies to transitions –a ius in interregno– should be undertaken in order to deconstruct these 
paradoxes from a legal perspective, and guards against some traps to be avoided in the elaboration of 
such a ius in interregno.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Since time began, the constitutional and institutional structures of states, empires or other systems of 
political organization have, at lesser or greater intervals, been profoundly modified. As such 
modifications cannot be realized overnight, interim political structures are generally set up to manage 
the transition. This paper discusses how domestic interim governance (‘DIG’) has evolved over time, 
why it has become popular, and which legal paradoxes are inherent to it. It argues that a 
comprehensive analysis of how international law applies to transitions –which, for ease of reference, 
may be called a ius in interregno– should be developed to grasp these paradoxes and to account for the 
modern nature and function of DIG. This paper does not yet fully address questions about the contents 
and normative value of a ius in interregno. It is divided in four parts. It (a) explains why DIG is on the 
rise, (b) illustrates the various ways in which DIG has become internationalized, (c) analyzes which 
legal rationales could be invoked to corroborate its success, and, lastly, (d) suggests that, in the 
elaboration of a ius in interregno, these rationales be further deconstructed.  
The rise of domestic interim governance  
History is replete with instances of DIG. These range, only to give random examples spanning three 
continents and more than two millennia, from the one-year interregnum after Romulus’ death (ca. 717 
BC)1, the Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1413)2 and the institutionalized interregna of the Loango 
Kingdom in the basin of the Kouilou and Niari rivers3 (18th century), to the Talleyrand French 
provisional government (1814). Each of these cases relate, in the first place, to issues of succession. 
During the 20th century the function of DIG diversified. Throughout this century interim structures 
were created, successfully or not, to deal with matters of regime or personal succession4, to overthrow 
or restore political regimes5, to resist foreign occupation6 or protest against international border 
                                                      
1 This interregnum by the Senate (on rotational basis) was due to disagreement about whether a Sabine or Roman king should 
succede to Romulus. In 715 BC a compromise was finally reached about Numa Pompilius as the successor king. After his 
death in 673 BC, another one-year interregnum followed.  
2 The interregnum was observed by a triumvirate in the context of a war of succession following the defeat of Sultan Bayezid 
I by Turco-Mongol warlord Timur. See D. J. Kastritsis, The Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1413): Politics and Narratives 
2 The interregnum was observed by a triumvirate in the context of a war of succession following the defeat of Sultan Bayezid 
I by Turco-Mongol warlord Timur. See D. J. Kastritsis, The Ottoman Interregnum (1402-1413): Politics and Narratives 
of Dynastic Succession, Harvard University, 2005, for a detailed account.  
3 Abbé Proyart explains in 1776 how interregna were institutionalized in this African kingdom: “à la mort de chaque Roi, il y 
a toujours un interrègne pendant lequel on célèbre les obsèques du défunt [...] Le Royaume alors est gouverné par un 
Régent, qui prend le titre de Ma-Boman, c’est-à-dire, Seigneur de la terreur, parce qu’il a droit de se faire craindre par 
tout le Royaume. C’est le Roi qui de son vivant nomme le Ma-Boman: la Loi même, pour prévenir les inconvénients de 
l’anarchie, l’oblige à en désigner deux, dont le second, en cas de mort du premier, est chargé des affaires, jusqu’à ce 
qu’on ait procédé à l’élection d’un nouveau Roi. C’est pendant cet interrègne que les Prétendants à la Couronne forment 
leurs brigues, et qu’à force de présents et de promesses, ils tâchent de se rendre les Electeurs favorables. Ces Electeurs 
font les Princes, les Ministres et le Régent”. L.-B. Proyart, Histoire de Loango, Kakongo, et autres royaumes d’Afrique  : 
rédigée d’après les mémoires des préfets apostoliques de la Mission françoise, Bruyset-Ponthus, Lyon, 1776. The long 
interregnum starting in 1786 was the result of conflicts over the distribution of powers, and announced the end of this 
kingdom in ca. 1800.  
4 1917 Russian Provisional Government (Russian Republic as transition between Russian Empire and the Russian 
Federation); 1944-1950 Regency Prince Karel of Belgium (legal impossibility of King Leopold III to rule); 1989-1991 
provisional governments in the context of the fall of communism.  
5 1912 Chinese provisional government (Xinhai Revolution & overthrow imperial dynasty).   
6 1919-1948 Provisional Government of Republic of Korea (resistance against Japanese empire); 1944 – 1946 Gouvernement 
provisoire de la République française (Resistance against German occupation).  
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settlements7, to struggle against domestic repression8, to strive for independence9, or to indirectly 
control foreign territory10. Denominations such as ‘provisional government’, ‘interim government’, 
‘transitional council’ or more generally ‘transitions’ have been used in relation to all of these 
functions. 
After 1989 the context, nature, and function of DIG changed dramatically. DIG became disassociated 
from decolonization, secession or dissolution processes, and emerged more frequently in the context 
of non-international rather than international armed conflicts11. Furthermore, while before 1989 DIG 
resulted either from ‘incremental, multi-channel constitutional regime changes’ (Eastern Europe) or 
from ‘quick clean breaks and new permanent constitutions under occupying forces’ (Japan, Germany), 
after 1989 it became more and more based on ‘interim constitutions in planned stages’12. DIG became 
a process whereby transitional authorities introduce a wholesale constitutional transformation on the 
basis of interim frameworks. Lastly, after the end of the Cold War, the international community started 
supporting the installation of interim political bodies intended to bring peace and security in conflict-
riven states. As a result, “[d]espite the domestic character and significance of governance transitions, 
the assembly and maintenance of interim structures has increasingly become an international 
project”13. This remarkable evolution will be sketched in the following lines.  
Modern-day DIG can be defined as follows. It is a staged form of DIG introducing a 
reconstitutionalization process based on a supraconstitutional interim framework. The intellectual 
foundation of this model is partly tributary to the well-known and much-analyzed South African 
interim experience (April 1994 - February 1997)14. DIG has become particularly popular since the 
                                                      
7 1913 Provisional Government of Western Thrace (protest against border settlement of the 1913 Treaties of Bucharest and 
Constantinople); 1914 Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus (protest against Protocol of Florence to the 1913 Treaty 
of London).  
8 1915-1918 Armenian ‘Republic of Van’ (resistance against Ottoman rule during Russian occupation).  
9 1915 Nationalist Provisional Government of India (independence from British rule); 1918 Estonian Provisional Government 
(independence from Russian Federation / German occupation); 1918 Latvian Provisional Government (independence 
from Russian Federation / German occupation); 1922 Provisional Government of Ireland (transition towards 
independence from Great Brittain after Anglo-Irish Treaty); 1946-1947 Interim government of India (decolonization); 
1948-1949 Provisional Government of Israel; 1954-1962 Provisional Government Algerian Republic (decolonization); 
1971-1972 Provisional Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 
10 1937-1940 Provisional Government of the Republic of China (vassal government of Japanese Empire).  
11 “[m]ost civil wars today end in negotiated settlements, and in most instances part of such agreements is agreement on a 
defined political pathway through which a transitional process to consolidate peace is to unfold. These transition paths 
often feature the formation of transitional governments, sometimes constitution-making processes, and, at some point, an 
electoral process and event to give post-war governance a new sense of legitimacy. The transition sequences and 
institutional choices made in war-settlement negotiations often determine the nature and timing of initial post-war 
elections; in turn, these electoral processes deeply affect the nature of the state that emerges for years to follow”. T. D. 
Sisk, ‘Elections and Statebuilding after Civil War, Lurching toward legitimacy’ in D. Chandler, T. D. Sisk (eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding, Routledge, London, New York, 2013, p. 259.  
12 V. C. Jackson, ‘What’s in a name? Reflections on timing, naming, and constitution-making’, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev., 
2007-2008, pp. 1249-1305.  
13 K. Guttieri, J. Piombo (eds.), Interim Governments – Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, United States 
Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 2007, p. 3.  
14 The intellectual ownership of this model can most probably be attributed to the Constitutional Committee of the African 
National Conference, and to Suzuki Yasuzo. See A. Sachs, ‘South Africa’s Unconstitutional Constitution: the Transition 
from Power to Lawful Power’, Saint Louis University Law Journal, vol. 41, pp. 1249-1258, and p. 1255, where Sachs 
explains that the two-staged model of interim governance was an instrument to reconcile divergent approaches between 
the ANC (elections for a constituent assembly) and the then South African government (constitution seen as a safeguard 
against retaliation): “[o]ur answer was to have a two-stage process of Constitution making. The first stage was to agree 
on the process of transition including elections and the basis for the elections; to establish a new government, a new 
Parliament which would elect a new president; and, to have a Bill of Rights that would function in the meanwhile to 
protect fundamental rights. The second stage would be to entrust the new Parliament with a Constitution-making function 
The need for a ius in interregno 
3 
South African staged transition from Apartheid to post-Apartheid based on the 1994 interim 
constitution, yet was not always accompanied with equally successful results. Since the South African 
transition, DIG continued to be deployed in various states nonetheless. DIG remained by definition 
domestic but became increasingly influenced by international diplomacy. A well-known example in 
this regard concerns the adoption at an international conference of the 2001 Bonn Agreement, which 
provided an interim constitutional framework to regulate DIG in Afghanistan. In its basic structure, the 
model of internationally assisted DIG was replicated in various other countries like the DRC (2002), 
Côte d’Ivoire (2003), Somalia (2004), Iraq (2004), Sudan (2005), Nepal (2007), Guinea (2010), 
Kyrgyzstan (2010), Libya (2011), Yemen (2011), Guinea-Bissau (2012), Mali (2012), Central African 
Republic (203), Burkina Faso (2014), Ukraine (2015) and perhaps Syria (2015). The success of 
internationally assisted DIG can probably be explained by the relative diminution of state creation and 
the unsustainability of direct ITA. These are the two main material historic-economic reasons 
accounting for the turn to DIG.  
Recent (and sometimes forcible) attempts to redraw the borders of Ukraine or of states in the Middle-
East/North Africa region (e.g. Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq) do not amount to state creation. Less 
recent attempts to create new states like Kosovo, Abkhazia or South Ossetia are not only rare but also 
controverted and legally unsettled, contrary to the successful and now uncontroverted state creation 
generated by the dissolution of the USSR and the decolonization process. Compared to the second half 
of the twentieth century, the creation of new states in the twenty-first century has thus become 
relatively rare. If geopolitics are to follow the path of lesser resistance, state creation is not really an 
option anymore as its zenith is now passed. This is one reason why, from a geopolitical viewpoint, 
DIG nowadays is attracting more interest.  
Compared to the millennium turn, instances of foreign or direct ITA (1999-2002), whether or not in 
conjunction with belligerent occupation, are decreasing, yet continue to receive much scholarly 
attention15. All trusteeship operations were suspended in 1994, and today “there is no support for the 
formal revival of a system of UN trusteeship”16. In the late 1990s, ITA was deployed in Kosovo and 
East Timor, yet this form of administration became severely criticized both on normative and material 
grounds. The normative critique relates to the democracy/accountability deficit and neo-colonialist 
function reproached to ITA17. The costly and ponderous nature of ITA, requiring the UN (almost) to 
substitute itself to states18, constitutes the material ground on which ITA is criticized19. Faced with this 
(Contd.)                                                                    
within a framework of agreed-upon principles”. For the Japanese intellectual origin of staged DIG, see S. B. Hamano, 
‘Incomplete Revolutions and not so Alien Transplants: the Japanese constitution and human rights’, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
415 (1998-1999), p.428: “[a]lthough Suzuki advocated a republican government, he thought that a transitional phase was 
essential and so argued for a two-step approach beginning with a democracy retaining the emperor system followed by a 
reconsideration of this choice when the country had gained experience with democracy”.  
15 See, for example, E. De Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International Territorial 
Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009; B. Knoll, The legal status of territories subject to administration by international organizations, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008.  
16  M. Berdal, S. Economide (eds.), United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004, Cambridge University Press, p. 31.  
17 R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration – How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away, 
Oxford University Press, 2008. See also C. Bull, No Entry Without Strategy – Building the Rule of Law under UN 
Transitional Administration, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New York, Paris, 2008.  
18 Y. Daudet, ‘L’exercice de compétences territoriales par les Nations Unies’, http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/4%20-
%20yves%20daudet.17-64.pdf, pp. 54, 58 : « [l]es opérations conduites dans ces territoires, après celle du Cambodge, 
sont lourdes tant au point de vue quantitatif par les personnels déployés et les coûts engendrés qu’au point de vue 
qualitatif par les missions entreprises et les résultats obtenus. Dès lors que les Nations Unies se substituent à des Etats 
défaillants ou remplissent sur des territoires non autonomes des missions comparables à celles dont étaient investies des 
puissances mandataires ou chargées d’une tutelle, les compétences dont elles disposent sont celles d’Etats souverains ». 
19 C. Bull, No Entry Without Strategy – Building the Rule of Law under UN Transitional Administration, op. cit. About 
UNTAET, see S. Chesterman, ‘East Timor’, in M. Berdal, S. Economide, (eds.) United Nations Interventionism, 1991 – 
2004, op. cit., p. 192: “East Timor presents two contradictory stories in the history of UN peace operations. On the one 
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double critique, the UN, for the first time in Afghanistan, opted for a ‘light footprint’ approach20, the 
effectiveness of which depended on DIG. Ponzio observes that it was “the first time that domestic 
transitional authorities of this kind [i.e. the Afghanistan Interim, then Transitional Authorities] were 
instituted during an international peacebuilding operation”21. Under the light footprint approach, the 
UN, acting as a broker rather than a guarantor of international peace and security, was expected (only) 
to assist states in transition rather than to (directly) administer them. Writing about the UN mission in 
Afghanistan, Afsah & Guhr remarked that “emphasis has been placed on ensuring Afghan ownership 
of the reconstruction process”22.  
The light footprint was intended to rectify the prevalent ‘heavy international footprint’23. It conforms 
to the 2000 Brahimi report, which questioned whether the UN should be further involved with ITA, 
even whether it “should be in this business at all”24. Light footprint proponents “decry the enormous, 
unsustainable costs associated with twenty-first-century peace operations, the endless nature of 
missions that fail to define their exit strategy from the outset, and the culture of dependency that arises 
in populations under international administration or an excessive international presence”25. Assisting 
domestic transitions rather than bearing direct responsibility for ITA was seen as a “possible 
correction to the trend towards ever-expanding [UN transitional] mandates [...]”26, or as a reaction to 
the “well-known set-backs and over-extension of UN peace operations in the early 1990s”27. These 
circumstances generated a revisitation of prevalent practices. The light footprint approach was thus 
“hailed as a major conceptual revolution in United Nation thinking, developed out of the perceived 
failures in Kosovo, East Timor and elsewhere”28. Fundamentally, the novelty of the light footprint 
approach consisted in letting domestic transitions henceforth be internationally assisted.  
Yet, according to the former UN Representative for Afghanistan, L. Brahimi, this ‘conceptual 
revolution’ was never correctly implemented: “the United Nations, continued to operate, far too often, 
through parallel structures that did provide some services to the population but undermined rather than 
(Contd.)                                                                    
hand, it is an outstanding success. In two and a half years, a territory that had been reduced to ashes after the 1999 
referendum on independence held peaceful elections and celebrated independence. On the other hand, however, East 
Timor can be seen as a series of missed opportunities and wastage. Of the UN Transitional Administration’s annual 
budget of $500 million, only around one-tenth actually reached the East Timorese”.  
20 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’, 
A/56/875–S/2002/278 dd. 18 March 2002, p. 16: “UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan capacity (both official and non-
governmental), relying on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using 
common support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expatriate ‘footprint’”. The term was coined by John 
Renninger. See K. Annan, N. Mousavizadeh, Interventions – A Life in War and Peace, Penguin Books, London, p. 338.  
21 R. Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding, Aiding Afghanistan and other Fragile States, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 118.  
22 E. Afsah, A. Guhr, ‘Afghanistan: Building a State to Keep the Peace’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 9, 
2005, p. 382. In the same sense: E. De Brabandere, Post-Conflict Administrations in International Law: International 
Territorial Administration, Transitional Authority and Foreign Occupation in Theory and Practice, op. cit., p. 42: “that 
Afghanistan would not be a ‘full’ UN-led international administration like UNMIK or UNTAET. […] [T]he focus was on 
the greatest possible participation of local actors and less international involvement. […] [T]he Bonn Agreement did not 
give the UN a mandate to exercise administrative authority over the territory, nor a direct responsibility for the 
administration of the territory”. 
23 E. Newman opposes this to the ‘heavy international footprint’. E. Newman, ‘Liberal peacebuilding debates’ in E. Newman, 
R. Paris, O. P. Richmond, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New 
York, Paris, 2009, p. 32. 
24 A/55/305 – S/2000/809 dd. 21 August 2000 (the ‘Brahimi Report’), § 78. 
25 R. Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding, Aiding Afghanistan and other Fragile States, op. cit., p. 214.  
26 S. Chesterman, You, The People, The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p. 49.  
27 M. Griffin, B. Jones, ‘Building peace through transitional authority: new directions, major challenges’, International 
Peacekeeping, 7:4, pp. 75-90.  
28 E. Afsah, A. Guhr, ‘Afghanistan: Building a State to Keep the Peace’, op. cit., p. 382. 
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helped the state establish and sustain its credibility” 29. For Afsah & Guhr, too, “[t]he UN sometimes 
appear[ed] to be operating like a parallel administration”30. Despite the light footprint approach, 
international actors went well beyond acts of assistance and exercised significant leverage on the 
Afghan transition and statebuilding process. In the same vein, Schoiswohl writes: “[a]s a consequence 
of the international engagement that ultimately led to the ousting of the Taliban regime, the state-
building processes themselves are not purely domestic, but closely tied to the assistance provided by 
individual donors in conjunction with the United Nations and other organizations” 31. Because 
international states and organizations provided, to use the words of the 2011 International Afghanistan 
Conference, “direct service delivery”32 and were closely involved in the transition, their involvement 
triggered dependency schemes resulting in Afghanistan becoming a rentier state33. This was the result 
of an unbalanced interaction between (formal) domestic ownership and (overstretched) international 
assistance, an issue that is not irrelevant for other cases, also from a legal perspective, and to which we 
shall come back further below. 
These realities can hardly be associated to a light footprint approach. Such approach becomes a fiction 
when “formal authority remains with domestic actors but governance is dependent on international 
actors”34 (the ‘between trusteeship and partnership model’35). In spite of this, the conceptual turn 
represented by the light footprint approach at the dawn of the new millennium had a tremendous 
ideological effect. As DIG was deployed in a country that had known war for at least two decades, it 
became associated with its now generally accepted pacificatory function. International assistance to 
DIG increasingly came to fulfill the collective security function previously attributed to ITA36.  
If measured by its outcome, DIG in Afghanistan only produced mixed results, at best. The present 
security and political situation in Afghanistan leaves much to be desired. In other countries, 
international assistance to DIG was not more successful. Transitions in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (‘DRC’) (2002 - 2005), Iraq (2004 - 2005), Libya (2011 - ?), Yemen (2011 - ?) and Syria (2015 
perhaps - ?) did not bear fruit, if they were initiated at all. Yet, as we shall see, the conviction that 
internationalized DIG can bring peace in an uncertain world remains deeply entrenched in 
                                                      
29 L. Brahimi, ‘State-building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries’, 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building 
Trust in Government, 26-29 June 2007, Vienna, p. 17.  
30 E. Afsah, A. Guhr, ‘Afghanistan: Building a State to Keep the Peace’, op. cit., p. 418. 
31 M. Schoiswohl, 'Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the Formal Foundations of a State at Risk: 
Constitution-Making and International Law in Post-Conflict Afghanistan', Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 39 
(2006), pp. 861. About the Bonn Agreement: “[i]n attempting to strike a balance between the detrimental effects on the 
sustainability of reform attached to full-fledged international (U.N.) administration and the political risks associated with 
insufficient international involvement, the Bonn Agreement reflects a compromise between a domestic program for the 
consolidation of power and specific benchmarks to ensure that the state-building agenda evolves in a manner acceptable 
to the international community. In the latter regard, the international community acts as a watchdog of democracy, whose 
financial means in the form of bilateral and multilateral ‘benevolence’ entail significant leverage to inform the way by 
which Afghanistan is to rise to the circle of democratic states”. For a detailed description of the UN’s role in Afghanistan, 
see R. Ponzio, Democratic Peacebuilding, Aiding Afghanistan and other Fragile States, op. cit., p. 119.  
32 ‘Conference Conclusions of the International Afghanistan Conference entitled ‘Afghanistan and the international 
community: from transition to the transformation decade’, A/66/597–S/2011/762 dd. 9 December 2011, p. 3.  
33 A. Suhrke, When More is Less: the international project in Afghanistan, Columbia University Press, 2011.  
34 M. Saul, 'The Search for an International Legal Concept of Democracy: Lessons from the Post-Conflict Reconstruction of 
Sierra Leone', Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2012, p. 7. See also Nora Roehner, UN 
Peacebuilding - Light Footprint or Friendly Takeover?, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, Berlin 2012.  
35 Id.  
36 It is right that “[i]n the context of post-conflict peacebuilding, transitional administration represents an international 
response to an [internal] conflict whose belligerents are unable to arrive at or to implement a peace settlement or to 
govern themselves peacefully”. R. Caplan, ‘Transitional Administration’ in V. Chetail (ed.), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 
A Lexicon, Oxford University Press, p. 359. The use of the indefinite article indicates that other options are open as well.  
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international legal culture37. This is why, at the time of writing, we are witnessing more and more 
instances of DIG based on interim constitutional frameworks.  
The relevance of DIG has thus all but diminished anno 2015, even if scholarship has primarily dealt 
with transitional justice as one of its expressions or consequences. With the evolving of the 
international political context, the nature and function of DIG, too, has changed to a substantial 
degree. As before, DIG is limited in time, supersedes existing constitutional rules and procedures, and 
is observed by national actors. In short, it is temporal, nonconstitutional38 and domestic. Post-Cold 
War DIG, however, is characterized by two distinctive features.  
First, partly because DIG is mostly observed in anocracies, i.e. regime types where power is not firmly 
vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups constantly competing for power39, 
transitions “have become more complicated and, so, require greater and more protracted effort, and 
support, to accomplish and consolidate. Transition periods, and the anocratic regimes associated with 
such transitions, then, tend to last longer than they had in the past”40. The complexity of post-Cold 
War transitions translates into detailed supraconstitutional interim frameworks intended to govern 
two- or multi-staged transitions.  
Second, because DIG has been ascribed an ambitious, overarching function –that of bringing peace– 
actors from the international community increasingly monitor and/or co-define the supraconstitutional 
norms and procedures for reconstitutionalizing post-conflict countries, and do so with greater 
intensity. This is so even if DIG is observed by domestic actors. DIG is qualified as domestic not 
because its impact can be felt ‘on the ground’ (which obviously is the case with ITA and belligerent 
occupation, for instance, too) but in light of the non-international character or identity of the (main) 
stakeholders and beneficiaries appointed in the transition procedure. The signatories and/or ratifying 
parties of the instruments founding the transition (‘transition instruments’), and their main 
stakeholders and beneficiaries, are domestic actors. The qualification ‘domestic’ can be used 
notwithstanding the internationalization of DIG (e.g. the international impact on the creation of DIG or 
the international monitoring of DIG), or the international context in which the transition is triggered 
(e.g. an international conference or internationally brokered negotiations)41. It is to this issue, the 
internationalization of DIG, that we turn now.  
                                                      
37 "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and 
develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward [law]", paraphrasing C. J. Geertz’ definition of culture. C. J. Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York, 1973, p. 89.   
38 Suffice here to say that nonconstitutionality refers to the adoption of texts, or to the execution of actions, which are, if not 
contra constitutionem then at least praeter constitutionem. Nonconstitutionality can refer to the modification of the 
constitution without following explicitly foreseen constitutional (amendment or revision) procedures, or to the 
establishment of (transitional) institutions not foreseen by the constitution, either to transform the existing constitutional 
order (this would be both praeter constitutionem and unconstitutional) or to restore it (this would be praeter 
constitutionem without necessarily being unconstitutional).  
39 “Also included in the anocracy category in this treatment are countries that are administered by transitional governments”; 
“Research indicates that anocracies have been highly unstable and transitory regimes, with over fifty percent 
experiencing a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years”, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf. Emphasis added. In the same sense, K. Guttieri, J. Piombo (eds.), 
Interim Governments – Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, op. cit., p. 4. 
40 Id. Own emphasis.  
41 The institutional bases for the transitions in Afghanistan and Burundi, for example, were negotiated in international 
conferences (the 2001 Bonn Conference and the Arusha peace process, respectively), yet these countries were never 
considered to be under ITA. Even though their interregnum was internationalized, their transitions were formally 
domestic.  
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The internationalization of domestic interim governance 
In the last couple of decades, the international community has placed a heavy burden on DIG. It has, 
in a sense, aggrandized its core function. In line with a widespread discourse and conviction, DIG has 
been assigned the challenging task of bringing peace to post-conflict countries. This is why in recent 
history the so-called international community has shown a keen interest in domestic 
reconstitutionalization processes carried out by transitional authorities. In 2007 Guttieri & Piombo 
already wrote that “[b]y the late 1990s and early 2000s […] the role of the international community 
increased. Great powers and international institutions –no longer stymied by Cold War rivalry– took in 
expanded and more direct roles in the creation and maintenance of interim governments”42. The 
conviction and discourse that transitions are conducive to peace transpires in the practice of various 
actors operating at the global, regional and state level. Unsurprisingly, DIG is the preferred option for 
peace processes. The 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding architecture also remarks this, and 
describes as follows how DIG has become part and parcel of the international community’s conflict 
resolution toolbox: 
“Over the last couple of decades, a rough template seems to have emerged for international response 
to post-conflict challenges. First, mediators achieve a peace agreement, usually fragile and not 
always sufficiently reflective of the local dimensions of the conflict. This is followed by a limited 
“Transition” period, often accompanied by temporary power-­‐sharing arrangements and/or some 
form of “National Dialogue” process. Within a year or so, a new constitution is drafted and adopted. 
The culmination is the holding of new and democratic elections – usually a massive logistical 
exercise. This sequence obviously has as its intention the suturing of societal wounds and the careful 
installation of new national authorities with a democratic mandate to act as primary interlocutor with 
international partners for subsequent peacebuilding. But all too frequently this model breaks 
down”43 
The socialized conviction that transitions bring peace may be called the peace-through-transition 
paradigm. It is now widespread to the extent that, in spite of its deficiencies, some commentators 
consider that DIG could also function as a preventive measure in countries where war looms large44. 
The peace-through-transition paradigm translates into a socialized discursive practice based on the 
belief that the redefinition of the social contract is an effective conflict resolution mechanism. The 
2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture seems to suggest that this is a rather naive 
stance45. Without engaging with the question whether DIG is to be commended or not, this section 
merely observes that several strata of the so-called international community have recourse to DIG or 
promote it as a problem-solving tool. 
The internationalization of DIG operates on various levels, and is generated both by non-governmental 
and governmental actors. Within the last category not only the UN / UN Security Council and regional 
organizations but also diplomatic coalitions and individual states show a keen interest in influencing 
the redefinition of the social contract –in short, the reconstitutionalization– of countries said to be in 
transition. As actors engaged with DIG operate on different levels and in various constellations, the 
internationalization of DIG is multifaceted or even fragmented.  
 
                                                      
42 K. Guttieri, J. Piombo (eds.), Interim Governments – Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, op. cit.  
43 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding architecture dd. 29 June 2015, § 31.  
44 The fragile contexts of apparent calm but with a risk of renewed violence –as in Côte d’Ivoire anno 2015– would justify a 
transition phase, so as to “prioritize the birth of a new [social] contract” as a preventive measure. See ‘Côte d’Ivoire: 
Ivory Coast Needs a Transition Phase’, AllAfrica, 24 March 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201503302819.html.  
45 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, op. cit. See for example §§ 31, 32, 33.  
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The multitude of actors influencing interim governance  
The UN  
In order to accompany states through a stage of convalescence, the UN often relies on DIG. One of the 
UN’s approaches in post-conflict countries is to help install transitional governments, Ottowa & 
Lacina observed in 200346, or to assist countries in triggering domestic transition procedures. For 
Sripati, “following the Cold War, [the UN] assisted conflict-prone sovereign and independent states in 
sculpting new constitutions and in shaping political institutions. It now engages in internal governance 
not to decolonize, but to prevent conflicts and build peace”47. To this end, the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission, UN Peacebuilding Trust Fund and UN Secretariat48 increasingly turn their attention to 
countries experiencing a form of DIG. Further testament to the UN’s interest in DIG is that, within the 
UNDPA, a constitutional focal point (‘CFP’) was “established in 2013 in response to increased 
demand for UN assistance in constitution-making processes”49. The CFP centralizes knowledge with 
regard to constitutional transitions worldwide.  
The UN Security Council (‘UNSC’) bears the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security”50. More and more, the UNSC tries to discharge this obligation by 
having recourse to DIG. In line with the peace-through-transition paradigm, DIG is assigned the task 
not (only) of dealing with regime succession but also, and more ambitiously51, of coping with armed 
conflicts or threats against international peace and security. Bearing this in mind, the UNSC 
increasingly supports and monitors DIG. From the UNSC perspective, the pacificatory function of 
DIG comes to overarch and overshadow the functions historically attributed to DIG (e.g. succession, 
resistance, preparation for independence). Official statements with regard to Syria, Guinea-Bissau, 
Yemen and Libya clearly illustrate how deeply the peace-through-transition paradigm is entrenched in 
legal and diplomatic culture.  
• In August 2015, the UNSC demanded that all parties in the Syrian conflict “work urgently 
towards [...] launching of a Syrian-led political process leading to a political transition” so as to 
enable the Syrian people to determine their future “through the establishment of an inclusive 
transitional governing body”52.  
• In December 2013, the UNSC President affirmed that “the consolidation of peace and stability in 
Guinea-Bissau can only result from a consensual, inclusive and nationally owned transition 
                                                      
46 M. Ottaway, B. Lacina, ‘International intervention and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990s’, SAIS Review, Volume 23, 
Number 2, Summer-Fall 2003, pp. 71-92: “UN post-conflict interventions have followed one of three basic approaches, 
which vary greatly in the way in which they interfere with existing power structures. In most cases, missions have simply 
relied on the existing administrative and even political structures; in others, the missions have helped to install a local 
transitional government instead; in the most invasive cases, the UN has set up international transitional administrations to 
run the country for a period of time”.  
47 V. Y. Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in Comprehensive Peace Missions: An Inventory 1989 – 2011’, 
International Peacekeeping, 19:1, p. 94.  
48 The UNSG was for example closely involved in the constitutional transformation of Kenya where it mediated “a 
transitional arrangement that was to lead to a full process of root-and-branch constitutional reform”. K. Annan, N. 
Mousavizadeh, Interventions – A Life in War and Peace, Penguin Books, London, p. 202. 
49 http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Constitutions-2015.pdf.  
50 UN Charter, art. 24.  
51 This depends on the interpretation of ‘peace’ one chooses. There is no doubt that the exigencies of ‘absence of war’ are 
less high than the exigencies of substantive democracy. On the other hand, peace and democracy also belong to different 
conceptual categories, and a comparison is therefore not always possible.  
52 S/PRST/2015/15 dd. 17 August 2015, § 9.  
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process” 53. After determining that the situation in Guinea-Bissau constituted a potential threat to 
international peace and security, the UNSC actively monitored the transition54.  
• After the uprisings in Libya in early 2011, the UNSC55 and, shortly after, the AU56 observed that 
the situation posed a threat to international peace and security. Both at the global and regional 
level the answer to this threat consisted in the formulation of detailed DIG proposals. Although 
differing on some points, the two proposals thus committed to the peace-through-transition 
paradigm. The UNSC57 and the AU58 were both convinced that DIG was the only way to remedy 
the threat to international peace and security. As a result, Libya swiftly received UNSC-
mandated constitutional assistance59.  
• From late 2011 onwards, the UNSC closely followed the transition in Yemen, indicating that it 
did so “[m]indful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security”60. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in February 2015 the UNSC further 
insisted on “the full and timely implementation of the political transition”61.  
These short descriptions confirm the strong conviction that there is a direct causality between DIG and 
peace. They show how the UNSC appropriated the peace-through-transition discourse to remedy or 
anticipate a threat to international peace and security. These are not exceptions. Comforted by the 
conceptual expansion of the definition of threats to international peace and security62, UNSC 
                                                      
53 S/PRST/2013/19, Statement by the President of the Security Council dd. 9 December 2013. Emphasis added.  
54 See also S/RES/2048 (2012) dd. 18 May 2012, Preamble. On this date the UNSC, “[m]indful of its primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations”, seized itself of the 
matter. See furthermore S/RES/2103 (2013) dd. 22 May 2013, S/RES/2157 (2014) dd. 29 may 2014, S/RES/2186 (2014) 
dd. 25 November 2014, and S/RES/2203 dd. 18 February 2015.  
55 On 17 March 2011, the UNSC determined in its resolution 1973 that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues 
to constitute a threat to international peace and security. See S/RES/1973 (2011) dd. 17 March 2011, Preamble. 
56 On 26 April 2011, The AU Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya “stressed the serious threat that this situation poses 
for peace, security and stability in the region as a whole, and reaffirmed AU’s conviction on the need for an urgent 
African action”. See ‘Report of the chairperson of the commission on the activities of the AU High Level Ad Hoc 
Committee on the situation in Libya’, 26 April 2011, § 15, available on http://www.peaceau.org 
/uploads/275reportonlibyaeng.pdf.  
57 On 16 September 2011, the UNSC looked forward to the establishment of a transitional Government of Libya, and 
communicated a number of guidelines that were to be followed by the National Transitional Council. In so acting, the 
UNSC seconded the basic idea underpinning the proposals and exhortations previously made by the AU.  
58 On 26 April 2011, the AU Ad-Hoc High-Level Committee on Libya had “reaffirmed the relevance of the elements of the 
Roadmap articulated by the Council. It invited the Libyan authorities and the TNC to a meeting to be convened, as soon 
as possible, in Addis Ababa or in any other venue agreeable to the parties, to discuss this Roadmap, in particular the 
establishment and the management of an inclusive transitional period that would lead to political reforms meeting the 
aspirations of the Libyan people” (‘Report of the chairperson of the commission on the activities of the AU High Level 
Ad Hoc Committee on the situation in Libya’, op. cit., § 17.2. Own emphasis). On 25 May 2011, the Assembly of the AU 
again “stressed that the ceasefire should lead to the establishment of a consensual and inclusive transitional period during 
which the necessary reforms to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Libyan people would be carried out, culminating in 
elections that would enable the Libyans to choose freely their leaders” (‘African Union Decision on the Peaceful 
Resolution of the Libyan Crisis’ dd. 25 May 2011. Own emphasis). 
59 V. Sripati, ‘United Nations Constitutional Assistance in Statebuilding’ in D. Chandler, T. D. Sisk (eds.), Routledge 
Handbook of International Statebuilding, op. cit., p. 143.  
60 S/RES/2051 dd. 12 June 2012, Preamble. See also S/RES/2140 (2014) dd. 26 February 2014, in which the UNSC 
“determin[ed] that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region”, 
“[w]elcomes the recent progress made in the political transition of Yemen and expresses strong support for completing 
the next steps of the transition”.  
61 S/RES/2204 dd. 24 February 2015, § 1.  
62 2005 World Summit Outcome, UNGA Res. 60/1 (24 October 2005), §§ 6 and 69. See also ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, UN Doc/59/2005, 24–5: “threats to peace and security in the twenty-
first century include not just international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism and weapons of 
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resolutions often provide in detail how transitions are to deal with such threats, or explicitly endorse 
transition agendas defined elsewhere63. The UNSC has adopted resolutions under Ch. VII of the UN 
Charter with regard to (projected) transitions in South Sudan64, Somalia65, Libya66, Mali67, Côte 
d’Ivoire68, Central African Republic (‘CAR’)69, Yemen70, Guinea-Bissau71, Libya72, Haiti73, and 
Afghanistan74 (reversed chronological order). Seven of these resolutions were adopted in 2014. The 
UNSC furthermore reserves the power to take sanctions against anyone impeding transitions. It has 
created sanction regimes, and regularly threatens to apply sanctions against so-called spoilers of DIG. 
During this decade the UNSC has done so against (potential) transition spoilers in Burkina Faso75, 
Yemen76, CAR77, Somalia78, and Côte d’Ivoire79. 
In addition, the UNSC establishes UN missions to monitor transitions, sometimes in collaboration 
with the UN Development Programme (‘UNDP’). In different cultural and political settings, such 
missions are mandated to keep a close eye on DIG. The UN itself observes that “[a]lthough each UN 
(Contd.)                                                                    
mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can 
have equally catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life chances on a large scale. All of 
them can undermine States as the basic unit of the international system”.  
63 See for example S/RES/2118 (2013) dd. 27 September 2013 in which the UNSC endorses the transition agenda of the 
Geneva Communiqué dd. 30 June 2012.  
64 S/RES/2187 dd. 25 November 2014. 
65 S/RES/2182 dd. 24 October 2014. 
66 S/RES/2174 dd. 27 August 2014.  
67 S/RES/2164 dd. 25 June 2014.  
68 S/RES/2153 dd. 29 April 2014 in which the UNSC refers to the Ouagadougou Agreement and “[d]ecides that the Ivoirian 
authorities shall submit biannual reports to [a] Committee […] on progress achieved in relation to DDR and SSR”.  
69 S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014.  
70 S/RES/2140 dd. 26 February 2014.  
71 S/RES/2048 dd. 18 May 2012.  
72 S/RES/2009 dd. 16 September 2011 in which the UNSC directly addressed itself to the National Transitional Council on 
the topic of the transition.  
73 S/RES/1529 dd. 29 February 2004 § 1.  
74 S/RES/1386 dd. 20 December 2001 in which the UNSC refers to the Bonn Agreement, which regulates the transition in 
Afghanistan. The Bonn agreement refers to S/RES/1378. For a discussion, refer to T. Marauhn, ‘Konfliktbewältigung in 
Afghanistan zwischen Utopie und Pragmatismus’, Archiv des Völkerrechts, Bd. 40 (2002), p. 496.  
75 In February 2015, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs J. Feltman declared with regard to Burkina Faso that 
“the international community will not tolerate any obstacle to the transition. Those who threaten the transition should be 
aware that the international community is watching and will hold them accountable”. UN News Centre, ‘International 
community ‘will not tolerate’ obstacles to Burkina Faso transition, says UN political chief’, 4 February 2015.  
76 See S/RES/2140 dd. 26 February 2014, in which the UNSC “determin[ed] that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security in the region”, “[w]elcomes the recent progress made in the political transition of 
Yemen and expresses strong support for completing the next steps of the transition”, and even establishes a sanction 
committee monitoring the activities of individuals or entities that may threat the peace, security or stability of Yemen by 
“[o]bstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition”. See also S/PRST/2014/18, Statement 
by the President of the Security Council dd. 29 August 2014. Already in June 2012, the UNSC was “expressing concern 
at the recent deterioration of cooperation among some political actors and actions that could adversely affect or delay the 
political transition process” (S/RES/2051 dd. 12 June 2012). See also S/RES/2216 dd. 14 April 2015, Annex, § 2. See 
also S/RES/2204 dd. 24 February 2015 in which the UNSC emphasized the critical importance of the sanctions regime.  
77 S/RES/2127 dd. 5 December 2013, § 10; S/RES/2149 (2014) dd. 10 April 2014. 
78 S/RES/1844 dd. 20 November 2008, § 8.a.  
79 “Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures, for a period of twelve months, to prevent the entry into or transit 
through their territories of all persons designated by the Committee established by paragraph 14 below, who constitute a 
threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular those who block the implementation 
of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements”, S/RES/1572 dd. 15 November 2004, § 9. 
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peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of 
mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council”80. A UN mission’s mandate typically includes 
assisting states in transition with their reconstitutionalization process. This task is either directly 
foreseen in UNSC resolutions or results from the circumstance that UN missions are required to 
monitor or assist the implementation of a (peace) process itself stipulating that the assisted country be 
reconstitutionalized. This task may also be associated to practices known under denominators such as 
peacebuilding81, rule of law assistance82 or electoral reform83. In short, assistance to 
reconstitutionalization has become a central part of the portfolio of UN missions. Since the end of the 
Cold War the UN –through UNSC, UN missions and/or UNDP– has been closely involved in at least 
thirty reconstitutionalization processes84.  
This trend confirms that the UN, in particular the UNSC, continues shifting “from a mainly politico-
military approach to international peace and security to a greater reliance on a legal-regulatory 
approach”85, now more and more based on UN assistance to DIG, especially when it comes to 
reconstitutionalizing countries. Rather than deploying ITA or (exclusively) relying on blue helmets or 
military intervention to confront armed conflicts or threats to peace, the UNSC increasingly places its 
confidence in DIG.  
In light of the historic-economic context of the peace-through-transition paradigm already sketched 
above, there is no doubt that the wholesale constitutional and institutional reconfiguration of a country 
–the renaissance of a state– nowadays is seen as an instrument for advancing collective security. It 
comes as no surprise, thus, that in recent years constitutional assistance has become an “established 
field”86 within the UN, even though the UN has no monopoly over the peace-through-transition 
paradigm.  
Regional organizations  
The peace-through-transition paradigm was also appropriated by a number of regional or sub-regional 
organizations. The most elaborate provisions with regard to domestic nonconstitutionality are part of 
                                                      
80 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml.  
81 The UN 2006 Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory includes constitutionmaking under the heading of governance and 
participation.  
82 The 2000 Brahimi report advocated a doctrinal shift in the use of rule of law elements in peace operations. Constitutional 
reform can be regarded as a reform area of UN rule of law assistance. See R. Sannerholm, ‘The United Nations Security 
Council, Peacekeeping and the Rule of Law’, working paper available on http://regnet.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ 
publications/attachments/2015-05/Sannerholm_3.2__1_0.pdf.  
83 Sripati rightly notes that “the UN has long used the generic term ‘electoral assistance’ to cover for constitutional assistance, 
thereby indicating that it has merely a facilitating rather than a directing or overseeing role. More significantly, in this 
way it has obscured the potentially paternalistic nature of constitutional assistance”. V. Sripati, ‘United Nations 
Constitutional Assistance in Statebuilding’ in D. Chandler, T. D. Sisk (eds.), Routledge Handbook of International 
Statebuilding, op. cit., p. 144.  
84 Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, DRC, East Timor, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guyana, Haiti, Iraq, 
Kosovo, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Maldives, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Solomon, Islands, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Tokelau, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe. See V. Y. Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in 
Comprehensive Peace Missions: An Inventory 1989 – 2011’, op. cit., pp. 93 – 113 & V. C. Franke & A. Warnecke 
(2009), ‘Building peace: an inventory of UN Peace Missions since the end of the Cold War’, International Peacekeeping, 
16:3, 407-436 for overview and context. The list in this paper is an aggregation of the countries under international 
constitutional assitance mentioned in both articles.  
85 P. Chitalkar, D. M. Malone, ‘The UN Security Council and Iraq’, UNU Working Paper Series, Nr. 1, November 2013, 
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5/wp01_theunscandiraq1.pdf, p. 4.  
86 V. Y. Sripati, ‘UN Constitutional Assistance Projects in Comprehensive Peace Missions: An Inventory 1989 – 2011’, op. 
cit., p. 93.  
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the African regional legal framework as developed after the decolonization process87 (before that, the 
OAU often supported nonconstitutional transitions as a way of realizing self-determination88). Since 
its 2000 Constitutive Act, the AU has adopted a policy of condemning any unconstitutional change of 
government89. This policy indirectly favors DIG as it obliges any group or government coming into 
being on an unconstitutional basis to relinquish power, a process which can take months or years and, 
again, is often accompanied by a reconstitutionalization process. Further testament to the reliance on 
DIG at the AU is that a CFP, already realized at the UN level, may soon be replicated within the AU 
structures. Also with the aim of creating an institutional memory on constitutional transitions, the AU 
is now considering the creation of a CFP within its Peace and Security Council90.  
Furthermore, a number of subregional organizations have been strongly encouraging and monitoring 
DIG. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) deeply impacted the transition in 
the CAR. Although the transition there was based on a domestic agreement (the 2013 Libreville 
Agreement) ECCAS “quickly took responsibility for the political management of the crisis and 
masterminded the 11 January 2013 Libreville Agreement, almost appearing to place the CAR ‘under 
its supervision’”91. ECCAS was also involved in setting up the ‘National Transitional Council’ 
responsible for managing the transition in the CAR 92. On the same continent, no one is in doubt that 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) strongly influenced the transition in 
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Mali. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 
lastly, had a heavy hand in the (unsuccessful) transition in Yemen. It was at the origin of the 2011 
Agreement which provided in detail how this transition was supposed to unfold.  
Diplomatic coalitions / contact groups 
In spite of their adherence to the peace-through-transition paradigm, international organizations are 
not always effective in monitoring DIG. In order to fill the gaps left by the lack of global/regional 
leadership, states and organizations gather in ad hoc diplomatic coalitions (‘contact groups’ or ‘friends 
of groups’) with a view to steering or monitoring transitions. The circumstance that the UN 
“increasingly giv[es] free reign to self-selected ‘coalitions of the willing’ to set their own conditions 
on when and how interventions should take place”93 thus applies not only to forcible interventions but 
also, more subtly, to non-forcible interventions in state transformation processes. 
The International Contact Group on Guinea, for example, reportedly “adopted a very firm position 
setting out the list of measures to be taken to allow Guinea to resume her transition process”94. In the 
DRC, the Comité international d’accompagnement de la transition (‘CIAT’), representing UNSC 
                                                      
87 M. Olivier, ‘The emergence of a right to democracy – an African perspective’, in C. Panara, G. Wilson, eds., The Arab 
Spring, New Patterns for Democracy and International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2013.  
88 A historical example whereby a regional organisation tried to trigger a nonconstitutional transition in the specific context 
of a liberation struggle is provided by the 1989 Harare Declaration, i.e. the ‘Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee 
on Southern Africa on the question of South Africa’ which states that “permanent peace and stability in Southern Africa 
can only be achieved when the system of apartheid in South Africa has been liquidated and South Africa transformed into 
a united, democratic and non-racial country”. Harare Declaration dd. 21 August 1989, Preamble, § 4. The same 
declaration provides that “the outcome [of such a process] should be a new constitutional order” (id., nr. 16).  
89 The 2000 African Union Constitutive Act. See also the 2000 Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to 
Unconstitutional Changes in Government and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.  
90 Initiative by Micha Wiebusch.   
91 International Crisis Group Report nr. 203, 11 June 2013, ‘Central African Republic: Priorities of the Transition’, p. 11.  
92 Id.  
93 D. Chandler, Empire in Denial – The Politics of State-building, Pluto Press, London, 2006, p. 60.  
94 Press statement available on http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/press-room/speaking-to-the-
media/press-releases/article/13-october-2009-meeting-of-the. Only available en cache.  
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members as well as representatives from six other states95 and three organizations96 exercised 
enormous leverage during the transition. A former member of CIAT testified that this committee “was 
a very important instrument to help the Congo to move forward. It also helped the international 
community to work as a unified entity, in dealing with the Congolese problem” 97. According to 
another source, CIAT was “widely credited as a beneficial and needed force to maintain progress”98. 
Further indicative of CIAT’s influence is the fact that “Jean Pierre Bemba had [...] [asked] for CIAT 
intervention to resolve the political impasse over allocation of the state companies' senior positions”99. 
As evidenced in various diplomatic cables, CIAT was involved in virtually all aspects of the DRC 
state renaissance100.  
Contact groups are not without antecedents in history101. But their number has sharply risen over the 
last two decades. Interestingly, this broadly coincides with the period during which DIG, too, has 
increased almost exponentially. For Saul, “[p]articularly noticeable are the conferences of friends at 
which the reconstruction targets of the state are mapped out and international assistance promised on 
this basis”102. Contact groups were thus created to monitor DIG not only in Guinea and the DRC but 
also in countries such as Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, 
Mali, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen. In addition, 
implementation committees can be set up specifically to control whether and how transition 
arrangements are implemented.  
As temporary coalitions103, contact groups have evolved from “ad hoc group[s] of senior diplomats 
and/or foreign ministers from three or more states created to coordinate their mediation of a 
conflict”104 to “ad hoc group[s] of senior diplomats and/or foreign ministers established to coordinate 
the policy of a coalition”105. In line with the latter description, Whitfield defines contact groups as 
“groups of the major powers interested in the outcome of a conflict”, and notes that they have been 
“vehicles for these powers’ direct diplomacy in a variety of different peace processes”106. Contact 
groups are mostly “self-selecting”107 or “self-serving”108 as they include “states with an overriding 
strategic interest in the outcome of a particular conflict, or [with] a proxy relationship with one of the 
                                                      
95 Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, South Africa, Zambia.  
96 The AU, the EU and the UN.  
97 See interview with Eoin Young, former member of CIAT: ‘South African Ambassador: The CIAT was a very important 
instrument for the DRC’, 12 December 2006, Reliefweb, http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/south-
african-ambassador-ciat-was-very-important-instrument-drc.  
98 Cable by Amb. Roger Meece dd. 5 November 2004, available on https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04KINSHASA2047_a. 
html.  
99 Cable by Amb. Roger Meece dd. 30 November 2004, available on https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04KINSHASA2183 
a.html.  
100 See, for example, Cable by Amb. Roger Meece dd. 5 November 2004, op. cit. 
101 See for example the role of the Western Contact Group for the transition to independence of Namibia.  
102 M. Saul, 'From Haiti to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in International Law', 
International Community Law Review 11, no. 1, 2009, p. 131.  
103 P. Dibb, ‘The future of international coalitions: How useful? How manageable?’, The Washington Quarterly, 25:2, 2002. 
pp. 129-144.  
104 G. R. Berridge, A. James, L. Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Own 
emphasis.  
105 Ibid. Own emphasis.  
106 T. Whitfield, ‘Working with Groups of Friends’, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., http://www.usip.org 
/sites/default/files/PMT_Groups_of_Friendsl.pdf, p. 33.  
107 Id., p. 6, p. 26. 
108 Ibid.  
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parties”109. It is arguably in this sense that contact groups, with the strong presence or marked absence 
of some powers, have supported oppositional transitional authorities in Libya and Syria110.  
Collaboration with contact groups is generally seen in a positive light, e.g. in Afghanistan111, the 
CAR112, DRC113 and Yemen114. This should not obscure the fact that such groups mostly assume the 
role of partial policy coordinators rather than impartial conflict mediators. It is inaccurate, even 
misleading, to portray such groups as agents of the international community115. Yet, being powerful 
policymakers, contact groups have the potential of catalyzing constitutional and/or regime change in 
conflict-striven countries116, even without being mandated to do so (note however that, at the stage of 
implementation, designated committees, often linked to contact groups, may have a formal role in 
monitoring compliance with the transition procedure).  
By triggering or endorsing constitutional and/or regime change, contact groups thus “risk replicating 
the conflict dynamics”117 in the realm of DIG, and beyond that. When conflict or crisis is followed by 
a contact group’s involvement with (self-proclaimed) transitional institutions, this may result in 
fundamental polity modifications of the ‘target country’ even in the absence of any boots on the 
ground. This can leave a permanent imprint on the state order of a country in transition, also beyond 
the interregnum. It is this kind of influence that individual states, too, sometime seek to exercise.  
Individual states  
Within the wide array of actors professing the peace-through-transition paradigm and impacting DIG, 
one should of course mention individual states. Examples are legion. Among other countries, the US 
                                                      
109 Id., p. 37.  
110 G. R. Berridge, A. James, L. Lloyd, The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Diplomacy, op. cit.  
111 With regard to the transition in Afghanistan, finally, the participants of the Bonn Conference took “note with appreciation 
of the close collaboration of the International Contact Group with the Afghan Government and their work, and encourage 
them to continue their joint efforts”. Conference Conclusions of the International Afghanistan Conference entitled 
‘Afghanistan and the international community: from transition to the transformation decade’, A/66/597–S/2011/762 dd. 9 
December 2011, p. 4.  
112 S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014, § 10: “[e]ncourages the Transitional Authorities with the support of key members of the 
International Contact Group to take immediate measures to revitalize the political process by agreeing on certain key 
parameters, which could include the possible creation of an international mechanism which would include key 
stakeholders, including the AU, ECCAS, the United Nations and the EU, as well as the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) as appropriate, to accompany the transition while respecting the sovereignty of the CAR, and requests 
the Secretary-General to report to the Council on progress taken in this regard”.  
113 M. de Goede, C. van der Borgh, 'A Role for Diplomats in Postwar Transitions?', African Security 1, no. 2, 2008. The 
CIAT (International Committee in Support of the Transition) has been described as playing “an essential role in the 
extremely complex transition process”, “an important role in reducing the opportunities for the unruly transitional 
government to manipulate the peace process”.  
114 S/PRST/2012/8 dd. 29 March 2012. With regard to the transition in Yemen, the UNSC affirmed the crucial role of the 
‘Friends of Yemen’ by “affirm[ing] their view that the Friends of Yemen have a particularly important role to play by 
bringing together the main international actors in a common endeavor to support Yemen’s overall transitional plans 
during the next two years”. 
115 For de Goede and van der Borgh, for example, CIAT, the contact group monitoring the transition in the DRC, “enabled 
the international community to speak with one voice […] [as] it was very well understood that a firm and united position 
from the international community would be key to the implementation of the transitional agenda”. See M. de Goede, C. 
van der Borgh, 'A Role for Diplomats in Postwar Transitions?', op. cit.  
116 For a critique, see M. D. Nazemroaya, ‘With ‘Friends’ like these...: America’s ‘Contact Group Industry’ is Overthrowing 
Governments’, 2012, available on http://www.globalresearch.ca/with-friends-like-these-americas-contact-group-industry-
is-overthrowing-governments/5302391.  
117 United Nations Guidance for Effective Mediation, available on http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/ 
shared/undpa/pdf/UN%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf, p. 19.   
The need for a ius in interregno 
15 
has developed a bilateral assistance-to-transition policy118, and has tried to bear on the 
reconstitutionalization of South Sudan, Sri Lanka and Ukraine, inter alia. Not long after civil war 
erupted in South Sudan, its overall constitutional structure was reconsidered, both within and outside 
the country. During a meeting of the UNSC in August 2014, the US ambassador “reiterated the need 
for both leaders [of the civil war] to put together a transitional authority”119. In Sri Lanka, the US 
closely followed the transition because it was “keen to bolster ties with countries throughout Asia as 
part of its effort to counterbalance an increasingly powerful and assertive China, which has sought 
strategic influence in Sri Lanka”120. In Ukraine, the transition was purportedly influenced not only by 
the US121 but also by the so-called Weimar Triangle (composed of Poland, Germany and France) 
which unsuccessfully brokered an agreement122 calling for a national unity government. After 
President Yanukovych’s nonconstitutional ouster123, the Yatsenyuk interim government received 
financial support from the EU124, Canada125, and the US126. After Crimea seceded, Russia, too, raised 
her voice about how Ukraine should rethink its constitutional structure127.  
Examples on the African continent or in the Middle East also abound. In 2012 the UN Secretary 
General called on the members of UNSC, and all countries with influence on Syria, to exert joint 
pressure for a transition to a legitimate government128. In 2014, “[t]he presidents of Ghana, Nigeria 
and Senegal urged Burkina Faso to appoint a transitional government”129 to lead a transition which 
was briefly interrupted by a coup in September 2015 but subsequently restored. In 2015, Iran pushed 
for a unity government to initiate a transition in Yemen130. All these examples testify to the fact that, in 
our day and age, individual states increasingly (purport to) bear upon DIG in other countries.  
                                                      
118 US National Security Strategy, February 2015, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_ 
security_strategy_2.pdf, see the section about ‘Supporting Emerging Democracies’ (pp. 20-21).  
119 ‘Security Council concludes South Sudan visit’, UNMISS, 13 August 2014, 
http://unmiss.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=3465&ctl=Details&mid 
=6047&ItemID=4870229&language=en-US.  
120 ‘US security adviser Rice pledges help for Sri Lanka ‘transition’, Reuters, 7 February 2015, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/usa-srilanka-idINKBN0LA2KQ20150206.  
121 Obama told CNN's Zakaria that Washington “had brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine". Interview published on 
1 February 2015, available on http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2015/02/01/pres-obama-on-fareed-zakaria-gps-cnn-
exclusive/.  
122 Available on http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671350/publicationFile/190051/140221-UKR_Erk 
laerung.pdf.  
123 Even those who defend the Ukrainian revolution write that “there were no constitutional grounds for shortening the 
presidential term”. See http://euromaidanpr.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/the-ousting-of-yanukovych-was-legal/, 15 March 
2014. It seems that the impeachment votes did not reach the required three quarters of the 449-seated parliament. See 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/russia-in-ukraine-a-reader-responds/, 5 March 2014, where A. Deeks argues that 
“Yanukovych is still the incumbent and legitimate President of the Ukraine”.  
124 ‘EU offers Ukraine $15 billion, but help hinges on IMF deal’, Reuters, 5 March 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/03/05/us-eu-ukraine-support-idUSBREA240V020140305.  
125 ‘Ukraine to get $220M in financial support from Canada’, CBC News, 13 March 2014, http://www.cbc.ca/news 
/politics/ukraine-to-get-220m-in-financial-support-from-canada-1.2571510.  
126 ‘fact sheet: International Support for Ukraine’, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/04/fact-sheet-
international-support-ukraine.  
127 ‘Russia says it wants east Ukraine to stay with Kiev under reformed constitution’, Constitutionnet, 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/russia-says-it-wants-east-ukraine-stay-kiev-under-reformed-constitution, 16 
December 2014.  
128 K. Annan, N. Mousavizadeh, Interventions – A Life in War and Peace, op. cit., p. 369.  
129 ‘Thousands gather in Burkina Faso to denounce ‘military coup’’, The Guardian, 2 November 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/02/burkina-faso-thousands-denounce-military-coup. 
130 Iran says working to help Yemen form unity government to fix crisis, Reuters, 8 April 2015.  
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The multifaceted internationalization of interim governance  
DIG is influenced by the UN peacebuilding architecture, the UNSC and the missions it established, 
regional organizations, contact groups & implementation committees, and individual states. Of course, 
there is no doubt that transitions can be maneuvered by several actors at the same time. Multilateral, 
collective and state-to-state assistance to DIG are often exercised in tandem. The multitude of actors 
concurrently influencing DIG is palpable in various countries such as Afghanistan and Nepal. In 
Afghanistan, there were at least ‘six communicative circles of empire’ during Afghanistan’s 
interregnum (2001 – 2004), including the interim government and three ‘international community 
actors’ (the ‘six-plus-two group’, the UN mission and the UNSC)131. In Nepal, “[w]hile the peace 
process is largely domestically driven, it has been accompanied by wide-ranging international 
involvement, including initiatives in peacemaking by NGOs, the United Nations, and India, which, 
throughout the process, wielded considerable political influence; significant investments by 
international donors; and the deployment of a Security Council-mandated UN field mission”132.  
Several strata of the international community have an interest in promoting DIG, and for diverging 
reasons. From an optimistic perspective, the UN and regional organizations have recourse to DIG for 
rational reasons, i.e. to efficiently delegate their responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security; and contact groups and individual states would do so for selfless reasons, i.e. in the 
best interest of the states concerned. From another perspective, the UN and regional organizations 
promote DIG only to free themselves from their responsibilities by unsuccessfully placing this burden 
on DIG, which has a tendency towards failure; and contact groups and individual states would do so 
only for strategic interests, i.e. to bolster ties with countries or to counterbalance geopolitical 
ambitions of their peers. The circumstances of each case dictate a different perspective. In sum, 
external assistance to DIG vacillates between bona fide multilateral state transformation and interest-
based unilateral constitutional proxy politics.  
Whichever perspective is taken or preferred, the multilayered international community continues to 
portray the installation and/or monitoring of transitional institutions as a panacea for many problems. 
At all levels do external/international actors explicitly or implicitly rely on the peace-through-
transition discourse in order to justify their involvement with DIG, often in the name of the 
international community. It thus comes as no surprise that DIG has been internationalized in two 
interrelated senses: the international impact on DIG and the porosity of DIG to external influences are 
two sides of the same coin.  
The international impact on DIG  
International assistance in the context of DIG can easily evolve into something more than just that. It 
can fill a governance gap –frequently ascribed to the failing nature of a state– of such nature that, 
notwithstanding the nominal ownership of transitional authorities, the international community finds 
itself performing “quasi-governmental functions in war-shattered states, or what Fen Osler Hampton 
calls ‘proxy governance’, which involves international actors serving as ‘stand-ins’ for local 
authorities who are unable or unwilling to perform the needed administrative tasks themselves’”133. In 
the context of DIG this may be called ‘proxy interim governance’.   
                                                      
131 M. Bothe, A. Fischer-Lescano, ‘Protego et obligo, Afghanistan and the Paradox of Sovereignty’ in R. A. Miller, P. C. 
Zumbanse, Comparative Law as Transnational Law, A Decade of the German Law Journal, Oxford University Press, 
2012, pp. 291 – 299.  
132 S. von Einsiedel, D. M. Malone, and S. Pradhan, eds., Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012. 
133 R. Paris, ‘International Peacebuilding and The Mission Civilatrice’, Review of International Studies 28, n. 4, 2002, p. 645.  
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This is not to deny that regime trajectories sometimes undergo strong domestic influences. Köhler thus 
argues that, in the context of the Arab Spring, regime trajectories were much influenced by domestic 
military elites or defectors from the military134. Yet, such domestic influences, in this and other 
contexts, form only one (yet far from negligible) part of the picture. Regardless of the exact balance of 
power or division of labor, DIG generally goes hand in hand with some form of international –
multilateral, collective or bilateral– assistance, also in the absence of ITA. Saul describes this as the 
‘assistance model’135. The assistance model has led some authors to develop notions like ‘co-
sovereignty’ and ‘shared sovereignty’136, or even ‘suspension of sovereignty’, notions which, from a 
legal perspective, were rightly dismissed as “awkward”137. In any event, the influence of external 
actors on DIG can be felt to varying degrees. It was felt strongly in Burundi and the DRC, for 
example:  
“[i]n the cases of Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, regional actors and 
organizations pushed forward the peace process. While domestic actors managed these interim 
governments, external actors had significant input as to who could participate in the peace talks 
leading to the creation of the temporary regimes and who could lead those transitional governments 
once they were created. In this way, external facilitation in creating peace agreements left a strong 
imprint on the character and functioning of the subsequent domestic regime in each country”138.  
During the interregnum, enormous leverage can be exercised on a country’s reconstitutionalization. 
This trend was observed at the occasion of the Arab Spring. Since 2011, a number of transitional 
institutions were created under different forms and denominations in countries like Libya, Syria and 
Yemen. Maybe inspired by the hope of a revival of the democratic entitlement doctrine, public reports 
and press articles portrayed such institutions under an almost naively positive light. What is more, they 
were sometimes anticipatively entrusted (by their domestic constituencies, international actors, or 
both) with a formal incl. constitution-building role in the transition of their respective countries.  
The porosity of DIG to external influences 
In light of the above it is not surprising that DIG is much permeable to external influences. This is 
particularly evident from the reconstitutionalization of a country, a central aspect of DIG. International 
actors directly impact supraconstitutional interim frameworks (such as intrastate peace agreements or 
interim constitutions) regulating transitions (‘transition instruments’). The manifold references to 
international law in transition instruments are a clear expression of how DIG has become extremely 
porous to the influence of external actors. Whenever there is a power vacuum, such actors tend to rely 
                                                      
134 K. Köhler, Military Elites and Regime Trajectories in the Arab Spring – Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen in Comparative 
Perspective, EUI Thesis, 2013. This thesis argues that “military elite behavior shaped regime trajectories in the Arab 
Spring. Where the armed forces as an institution defected from the incumbent, the presidency immediately collapsed; 
where at least some military elites remained loyal, the respective chief executives survived in office for a significantly 
longer period” (p. 1).  
135 M. Saul, 'From Haiti to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in International Law', op. 
cit.  
136 For the development of the concept of ‘shared sovereignty’, see S. D. Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty – New Institutions 
for Collapsed and Failing States’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 85-120: “[s]hared sovereignty would involve 
the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of the target state or an indefinite period of 
time” (p. 108).  
137 K. Guttieri, J. Piombo (eds.), Interim Governments – Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, op. cit., p. 4: “[o]ne 
of the contradictions in this process rests in the awkward attempt to create a sovereign state by suspending sovereignty. 
Most recent state-building attempts entail removing a state’s ability to govern itself in order to reconstruct a new, 
sovereign state from without”.  
138 D. Curtis, ‘Transitional Governance in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, in K. Guttieri, J. Piombo 
(eds.), Interim Governments – Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?, op. cit., p. 171.  
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on international legal references. This is because, for domestic transitional authorities too, 
international law is seen as the residual legal system whenever a domestic legal system is being 
transformed. A perusal of post-Cold War transition instruments would thus most probably confirm that 
international law directly influences both their general ratio legis and individual provisions139. More 
generally, the peace-through-transition discourse transpires in transition instruments concerning 
Burundi140, Côte d’Ivoire141, DRC142 and Nepal143, for example.  
The absence of a homogeneous international community 
By entrusting DIG with a pacificatory function, the peace-through-transition paradigm has 
significantly reinforced the international relevance of DIG. Even if unrelated to decolonization, 
secession or dissolution processes, DIG is more than ever a matter of international concern. The 
international impact on DIG and its porosity to external influences jointly define the 
internationalization of DIG. As noted earlier, this reflects the shift from a politico-military to a legal-
regulatory vision of international peace and security. This vision is propagandized not only by the 
UNSC but nearly by all components of the international community.  
This apparent teleological commonality however hardly conceals underlying disparities. Such 
disparities are unavoidable given the diversity of goals pursued by a vaste array of actors engaged with 
DIG. The international attention for DIG was, therefore, never undivided or one-dimensional. This is 
so not only because of the multitude of actors influencing DIG, but also, and more fundamentally, 
given the absence of a true, homogeneous international community. Also when it relates to DIG, 
global governance is polycentric and heterarchical. In spite of the appearances conveyed by the peace-
through-transition paradigm, DIG is not a common goal pursued by a real international community, 
which, except as a categorical imperative, does not exist. In 1980 already, R.-J. Dupuy warned against 
the misleading words ‘communauté internationale’144. For lack of homogeneity, shared vision and 
                                                      
139 International assistance to interim governance is more likely to yield effects when there actually is a secondary interim 
legal framework that can be influenced. An interregnum that is not based on such a framework is less prone to 
international influence.  
140 Thus, under Ch. II ‘solutions’, which immediately followed Ch. I ‘nature and historical causes of the conflict’, the 2000 
Arusha Agreement mentioned the “[i]nstitution of a new political, economic, social and judicial order in Burundi” (art. 
5.1) following the “[s]peedy establishment of the transitional institutions” (art. 5.3).  
141 With respect to the transition in Côte d’Ivoire, the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Accord provides: “[a] Government of National 
Reconciliation will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the Paris Conference to ensure a return to peace and 
stability”. The Linas-Marcoussis Accord dd. 13 January 2003, art. 3.a.  
142 Similarly, inder II.5 the 2002 Pretoria agreement mentioned among its ‘transition objectives’, “the setting up of structures 
that will lead to a new political order”.  
143 In Nepal, the “progressive restructuring of the state” is a principal component of the 2011 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal dd. 
22 November 2011, Preamble.  
144 R.-J. Dupuy, Leçon inaugurale faite le Vendredi 22 Février 1980, Collège de France, Chaire de Droit International, 1980. 
“[q]uand on observe que la communauté internationale est également fréquemment prise à témoin ou présentée comme 
l’entité suprême de référence par les gouvernements, on mesure de quelles équivoques ce vocable est encombré” (p. 9). 
Dupuy distinguishes between a ‘communauté internationale historique’ and a ‘communauté mythique’. Dupuy remarks 
that internatonal law is evolving from a ‘droit de procédure’ to a ‘droit réglementaire’; “[l]a communauté internationale 
est une stratégie [...] le mythe communautaire doit être pris au sens où l’entendait Georges Sorel, celui d’un faisceau 
d’images motrices, animant une action polutique et informant l’évolution du droit. [...] En vérité la communauté se trouve 
elle-même au coeur d’une tension entre la solidarité et l’individualité [...] Il apparaît que le concept de communauté se 
situe lui-même à l’intérieur de la compétition. Toute communauté est conflictuelle: comment la communauté 
internationale établie sur un monde uni et déchiré, ne le serait-elle pas? [...] C’est ici qu’apparaît la mission majeure de la 
communauté mythique: elle est la source constamment renouvelée d’une contestation permanente au sein même de la 
communauté historique [...] La communaté mythique fait de la communauté historique une négociation continue” (pp. 24 
– 26).  
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shared responsibility, today’s pluralist international society can hardly be called a ‘community’145. One 
can therefore not assume that all international community actors have the same interest in relying on 
the peace-through-transition paradigm. While this paradigm suggests that DIG is an adequate 
instrument for coping with international armed conflict or threats to peace and security, a more 
realistic reading prevents us from accepting this as given.  
These observations are also relevant from a legal point of view. A legal assessment of international 
assistance to DIG cannot depend on ‘the international’ viewed as a monolithic bloc. Because the 
internationalization of DIG is multifaceted, the formulation of a ius in interregno as to how external 
actors may impact DIG should consider how when which of these actors purport to do so. Any 
comprehensive international legal analysis of DIG should thus be mindful of the fact that this form of 
governance, especially when interacting with heterarchical global governance, tends to vacillate 
between two extremes: multilateral state renaissance and unilateral constitutional geopolitics. This 
caveat is crucial because a central part of DIG –the reconstitutionalization process– intimately touches 
upon the transition state’s domaine réservé. On another occasion, these reflections –along with the 
following exploratory analysis of legal grounds potentially invoked to justify the increased resort to 
DIG– will be subject to deeper analysis146.  
The prima facie legal rationales for privileging domestic interim governance  
A critical international legal analysis of DIG should give thought to the following question. Can the 
success of DIG be underpinned by legal rationales? In other words, are there any legal reasons for 
privileging DIG over other forms of governance? One can think of three legal arguments to justify the 
choice of (international assistance to) DIG. First, DIG constitutes an alternative option when, in light 
of the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination, ITA may be deployed only as a last 
resort. Second, DIG may allow international actors to influence the interregnum with lesser constraints 
under international (humanitarian) law. Third, opting for DIG may be seen as a means for avoiding 
shared international responsibility between the domestic and international constituencies involved in 
DIG. Of course, a ius in interregno should carefully examine these contentions.  
International territorial administration as a last resort  
Two fundamental legal principles –state sovereignty and self-determination– may inform the choice 
for DIG. We have seen that, as a response to threats to international peace and security, the UN, other 
international organizations, contact groups and states increasingly create, empower or monitor 
domestic transitional authorities. This course of action may actually be preferred over ITA as ITA 
requires international actors to directly administer regime change, for which they assume direct 
responsibility. In addition, ITA may only take place under certain conditions.  
ITA must be inversely proportional to possible restrictions on state sovereignty and can only be used if 
it is not possible to achieve peace and security by other means147. If the principles of proportionality 
and subsidiarity legally limit the possibility of deploying ITA, then assisting DIG constitutes an 
                                                      
145 B. Urquhart, ‘The International Community - Fact or Fiction?’, Macalester International, 1995, Vol. 1, Article 7. Except, 
of course, if one advances a thin definition of international community. Thus, for Mosler, two elements were necessary 
for the existence of an international (legal) community: “the fact that a certain number of independent societies organised 
on a territorial basis exist side by side, and the psychological element in the form of a general conviction that all these 
units are partners mutually bound by reciprocal, generally applicable, rules granting rights, imposing obligations and 
distributing competences” (referring i.a. to the ‘constitutional elements in the international community’ and to ius 
cogens). H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, Sijthoff, 1980, p. 2.  
146 Cf. the author’s doctoral dissertation soon to be defended at the European University Institute under the title ‘Domestic 
interim governance in conflict-riven states – Towards a ius in interregno for regulating transitions’.  
147 T. Marauhn, ‘Konfliktbewältigung in Afghanistan zwischen Utopie und Pragmatismus’, op. cit., pp. 480-511. 
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alternative means for managing regime changes and/or coping with threats to international peace and 
security. According to this line of reasoning, the general deference to the principles of state 
sovereignty and self-determination may justify the preference of DIG over ITA. Some could argue that 
these principles would, at first sight, be ‘out of the radar’ when domestic, nationally owned transition 
procedures solely receive international assistance148.  
Less constraints under international (humanitarian) law 
At first sight, international assistance to DIG, contrary to belligerent occupation for example, seems to 
be nearly unrestrained by international law. When external influence is being channeled via domestic 
transitional authorities in the absence of, or independently from, belligerent occupation, the leverage 
for influencing the legal and institutional structure of a state seems to be enormous indeed. In case of 
belligerent occupation, the Hague and Geneva Conventions require that domestic laws already in force 
be, in principle, further applied. The latter convention explicitly provides that “the occupant [...] shall 
[...] respect[ing], unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country” 149. Consequently, as 
Stahn remarks, “[t]he authority of the occupant is limited by specific constraints emanating from the 
inviolability of the rights of the territorial sovereign and the limited regulatory powers of the occupant 
over the occupied territory”150. Belligerent occupation is thus, as Bhuta summarizes, “order-
preserving” because it is “constrained in its order-constitutive authority”151. 
In the absence of belligerent occupation, however, or when legislative changes are carried out directly 
by domestic transitional authorities, neither of said conventions is applicable. A fortiori their legal 
requirements cannot be violated. This would imply that, given the non-applicability of the order-
preserving legal instruments just mentioned, the legibus solutus international involvement with the 
reconstitutionalization of a country could lead to constitutional changes constitutive of a new politico-
legal order152. According to this line of reasoning, the external constitution of a new politico-legal 
order could be achieved not only to a lesser cost153 but also, so it seems, with a lower risk of legal 
noncompliance.  
Primary responsibility of transitional institutions  
The peace-through-transition paradigm heavily relies on the (formal) domestic nature of interim 
governance. Domestic actors are primarily responsible for observing DIG. This is at least what the so-
called international community tirelessly repeats. At the UN level, especially, the primary 
                                                      
148 This idea was advanced by Saul with regard to ‘popular governance of post-conflict reconstruction’. See, in this sense, M. 
Saul, Popular Governance of Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 26.  
149 Art. 43 of the 1907 The Hague Convention provides: “the authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the 
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country”. See also art. 64 of the 
Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention.  
150 C. Stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial Administration, Cambridge Studies in International and 
Comparative Law, p. 115. Stahn adds: “the laws of occupation are not intended to provide a general framework for 
reconstruction and law reform” (p. 119).  
151 N. Bhuta, 'Antinomies of Transformative Occupation', The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16 no. 4, 2005, p. 
727.  
152 With a grain of irony, Saul also observes that, where domestic transitional authorities consent to international assistance, 
the ‘order-preserving’ legal instruments central to the law of occupation do not apply: “[t]hat this law does not apply in 
the assistance model can help project the international involvement as benevolent and of little threat to political 
independence because, one might reason, if there were a threat to political independence, surely the law of occupation 
would apply?”. M. Saul, 'From Haiti to Somalia: The Assistance Model and the Paradox of State Reconstruction in 
International Law', op. cit., p. 140. 
153 It would not involve the various (financial, material and human capital) costs usually flowing from military occupation.  
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responsibility of domestic transitional institutions has been consistently emphasized, crescendo over 
time. In the resolution by which the Peacebuilding Commission (‘PBC’) was established late 2005, the 
UNGA “[a]ffirm[ed] the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and 
authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict [...] in identifying 
their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national 
ownership” 154. In 2009, the ‘Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate 
aftermath of conflict’ more strongly emphasized the imperative of local ownership155. Mid-2014 the 
PBC echoed the “principle of national responsibility”156.  
The principle of national ownership and responsibility is consistently being recalled by the UNSC157, 
too. On 14 January 2015, it “underline[d] that the primary responsibility for successful peacebuilding 
lies with national governments and relevant local actors, including civil society, in countries emerging 
from conflict”158. The UNSC confirmed this principle in various cases, for example with regard to 
transitions in the CAR, the DRC and Iraq. Even if undoubtedly the transition in the CAR is influenced 
by international monitoring activities and other external factors, the UNSC nevertheless “underscores 
the primary responsibility of the Central African authorities”159, e.g. to provide security and protect the 
law, and never fails to “reaffirm[ing] its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and unity of the CAR”160. The UNSC furthermore called on the CAR transitional 
authorities to complete their transition in line with the ‘Transitional Framework’161. In Iraq, too, the 
UNSC repeatedly affirmed the domestic responsibility for DIG162.  
Contact groups, too, emphasize that domestic transitional authorities are responsible for DIG. The 
CAR international contact group, representing more than thirty-five states and organizations163, 
“recalled the primary responsibility of the CAR stakeholders in resolving the serious crisis facing the 
country, stressing that the role of the international community is to support national efforts and not 
replace them”164. With regard to the DRC, while the international community, often acting through the 
CIAT, was massively involved in the Congolese transition, the Secretary General did not fail to note 
that “[t]he primary responsibility for fulfilling the above objectives [restoration of security; territorial 
                                                      
154 A/RES/60/180 dd. 30 December 2005, Preamble and § 10.  
155 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict dd. 11 June 2009, A/63/881-
S/2009/304, § 7.  
156 S/PV.7217, Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its seventh session (S/2014/67) dd. 15 July 2014, p. 14.  
157 S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014 in which the UNSC welcomes the designation of the transitional authorities in the Central 
African Republic, and “[u]rges” the Transitional Authorities “to accelerate the preparations in order to hold free, fair, 
transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections” and to launch “an inclusive political dialogue”.  
158 S/PRST/2015/2 dd. 14 January 2015 
159 S/RES/2121 dd. 10 October 2013, § 6. See also S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014.  
160 S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014, S/RES/2134 dd. 28 January 2014, S/RES/2127 dd. 5 December 2013, S/RES/2121 dd. 10 
October 2013, S/RES/2088 dd. 24 January 2013.  
161 S/RES/2127 dd. 5 December 2013, S/RES/2134 dd. 28 January 2014, S/RES/2149 dd. 10 April 2014.  
162 See for example S/RES/1723 dd. 28 November 2006 which repeatedly affirms the responsibility of Iraq (in various 
fields); or S/RES/1509 dd. 19 September 2003 which “[r]eaffir[s] that the primary responsibility for implementing the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the ceasefire agreement rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move 
forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a transitional 
government by 14 October 2003”. 
163 For a list, see http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/com-icg-car-08-07-2013eng.pdf.  
164 Conclusions of the fourth meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic dd. 21 March 2014, 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc.conclusions.4th-mtg.icg.car.pdf, § 9. 
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and administrative unification; the adoption of a transitional legislative framework; holding of 
elections] rests with the Transitional Government”165.  
The examples above, among many others, indicate that domestic transitional authorities operate under 
the guidance and impulsion of the UNSC or other organizations and/or contact groups while being 
themselves internationally responsible for the most important components of the transition. This 
responsibility generally concerns the execution of the transition roadmap itself as well as the 
safeguarding of safety and order, also in the context of quasi-international conflicts or proxy wars. 
With the decrease of ITA and increased recourse to DIG, difficult questions of international 
responsibility seem to be avoided as domestic transitional authorities would in principle be responsible 
for ‘their’ transition. This would imply that, by relying on DIG as a form of (rather discrete and cost-
efficient) proxy governance, international organizations and states can exercise a considerable 
influence on the ground even without exercising territorial control or deploying ITA. Notwithstanding 
their “massive international involvement”166, organizations and states would avoid the risk of being 
held accountable for possible wrongful acts committed at the occasion of DIG.  
A nuanced ius in interregno would have to counterbalance the simplistic but wide-spread contention 
that domestic transitional authorities always bear the final responsibility for internationally assisted 
DIG. As noted earlier, DIG involves several actors, many policy fields and a complex division of 
labor. It is multifacted. Would then, in spite of this, the end-responsibility for post-conflict transitions 
by default be attributed to domestic transitional authorities? Especially when regional or international 
assistance leaves a strong imprint on the interregnum, this premise seems rather paradoxical – a 
paradox carefully to be dissected from a legal perspective.   
The paradox of internationalized domestic interim governance and the need for a ius in 
interregno  
In light of the success of DIG, some thought was given to the following question: which legal 
rationales seem to be readily available to international actors purporting to explain their choice for 
assisting DIG? The three justifications given above were deliberately formulated in a rather superficial 
way, i.e. as prima facie arguments. By piercing this superficiality, the subtlety and difficulty of 
formulating a ius in interregno is further emphasized. In this sense, three particular difficulties can be 
identified which may be summarized as follows.  
First, international assistance to DIG may be preferred over ITA because the risk of violating the 
principles of state sovereignty and self-determination may seem less high. The choice for DIG 
however does not annihilate this risk. A thorough legal assessment based on said fundamental 
principles should take into account who offers such assistance, and in which manner. Second, even if 
order-preserving international legal instruments do not apply to DIG, one can question whether 
transitional authorities or international organizations, contact groups and states enjoy an absolute 
freedom when it comes to re-defining the social contract of a country in transition. Surely there must 
be limits to this, notably under the principle of self-determination (or, one might say in the context of 
DIG, self-redetermination). The difficulty however lies in defining these limits with sufficient 
precision. Third, one can question whether the monolithic vision of the UNSC, UNGA and PBC –i.e. 
the absence of division of responsibility for internationally assisted DIG and the mantra that domestic 
                                                      
165 Third special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo dd. 16 August 2004, S/2004/650, § 54.  
166 See http://constitutionmakingforpeace.org/sites/default/files/Constitution-Making-Handbook.pdf, pp. 73-74: “[a] key 
factor is whether the process is driven by local or external factors. If external, there are two possibilities: (a) the country 
is taken into international care and the United Nations or a regional organization takes over management of state affairs 
(as in Cambodia, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste), or (b) there is massive international involvement (as in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and Namibia)".  
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transitional authorities always carry this weight– is sustainable. In the following lines we will 
elaborate on the latter issue. We will ask whether a monolithic responsibility regime would constitute 
an improvement of the flawed ITA responsibility regime, question the conceptual simplicity of the 
prevalent DIG responsibility regime, and suggest that it be further dissected from an international legal 
perspective.  
The (lack of a) responsibility regime or (lack of) oversight mechanisms for ITA have been strongly 
criticized in literature. Wilde argues that ITA even represented a regression from the older mandate 
(1919 – 1945) and trusteeship (1945 – 1994) systems167. Can the delegation of responsibility from the 
international to the domestic level be considered as a (partial) redress for the shortcomings inherent to 
ITA? It is true that in the case of DIG, domestic transitional authorities are directly accountable both to 
the state’s citizens and to the UNSC. Contrary to ITA, transitional authorities, when acting as state 
agents, are directly accountable to their citizens168. As they act under the international legal restraints 
applicable to states generally, they also owe deference to the UNSC169. The Bonn Agreement, for 
instance, provided that the “actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be consistent with Security 
Council resolution 1378 (14 November 2001) and other relevant Security Council resolutions”170. ITA, 
by contrast, is a direct ‘outgrowth’ of the UNSC and thus enjoys a position of privilege vis-à-vis it. It 
is consequently not clear which accountability regime, if any, applies to it. The increased recourse to 
DIG seems to bring a welcome clarification in this regard. Given the UN’s insistence on the domestic 
responsibility of transitional authorities, the issue of attribution of responsibility would now be 
unambiguous. This apparent straightforwardness may, in part, explain the traction of modern DIG.  
The emphasis on domestic responsibility and national ownership in the context of DIG may appear to 
be laudable from a policy perspective: it can be viewed as challenging a culture of dependency171. Yet, 
the conceptual simplicity of the DIG responsibility regime barely conceals the underlying tensions of 
the –proverbial– ‘light footprint’ approach. Given the multifaceted internationalization of DIG, the 
impact of international actors on domestic transitions is enormous. This gives rise to a political tension 
whereby the “responsibilities or leadership or ownership lie with the domestic state but their partners 
(or joint stakeholder) decode the policies”172, in short, whereby there is a “separation between power 
and accountability”173.  
Importantly, this tension is not only of political nature. It can be translated into the following legal 
question. Do transitional authorities systematically bear responsibility for mismanaged transitions, or 
internationally wrongful acts committed at the occasion of DIG? Is this also the case when they 
administer the country during the interregnum only in part or in name? The insistence on domestic 
                                                      
167 R. Wilde, 'From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution 
of International Trusteeship, and the Framework of Rights and Duties of Occupying Powers', Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 31, 2009, pp. 134-135: “[I]international territorial administration marks 
a step away from internationalization, in that, in certain respects, it is not subject to international scrutiny equivalent to 
that which operated with respect to the Mandate and Trusteeship arrangements, and, as far as the UN Charter is 
concerned, colonialism […] Not only have ITA trusteeships not been subjected to much international oversight; [...] they 
have also been criticized on human rights grounds, for the lack of review mechanisms on the ground, and particular 
practices conducted”.  
168 This is reinforced by the not-so-innocent language of ‘failed states’. See R. Wilde, 'The Skewed Responsibility Narrative 
of the Failed States Concept', ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, vol. 9, 2002-2003, pp. 425-429.  
169 Art. 24 and Chapter II of the UN Charter.  
170 Bonn Agreement, Section V.5. 
171 Interview with Carlos Westendorp, cited in Y. Daudet, ‘L’exercice de compétences territoriales par les Nations Unies’, op. 
cit., p. 30 : « culture de la dépendance envers la communauté internationale”. It is also in this sense that M. Saul 
understands the concept of ownership, i.e. as opposed to international imposition. See M. Saul, Popular Governance of 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, op. cit., pp. 42-43.  
172 D. Chandler, Empire in Denial – The Politics of State-building, op. cit., p. 39.  
173 Id., p. 44. For Chandler, this goes together with a “marginalisation of the domestic political sphere” (p. 53). 
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responsibility for DIG should not obscure this uncomfortable puzzle. Because DIG is highly exposed 
to and malleable by international actors, it would be legitimate for a ius in interregno to critique the 
conceptual simplicity taken as a point of departure by the UN (UNSC, PBC, UNGA, UN Secretary-
General) as well as other organizations or contact groups.  
At three occasions, at least, states or organizations have actually challenged this vision by affirming 
that they are responsible or co-responsible for a successful transition. With regard to the purported 
transition in Syria, a number of states agreed that “[p]articipating States in Geneva II, in particular the 
permanent members of the Security Council, will share the responsibility for ensuring the full 
implementation of the political transition in Syria”174. Before being involved in the 
reconstitutionalization of Iraq, the US affirmed it would ensure that their intervention would bear 
fruit175. With regard to the transition in Afghanistan, finally, several states and organizations have 
indicated that, “[w]ith the conclusion of the Transition process, our common responsibility for 
Afghanistan’s future does not come to a close”176.  
At some occasions, the affirmation that responsibility for DIG is always domestic was thus already 
nuanced. In the above cases, several state representatives seem to have acknowledged that their 
countries’ involvement with DIG may not be without legal consequences if internationally wrongful 
acts are committed at the occasion of DIG. Yet, these statements remain sporadic, and international 
practice has not unequivocally followed suit. This is precisely why a better understanding of how 
international law regulates, or relates to, DIG is needed. Pretensions of conceptual clarity, even in 
higher political or diplomatic spheres, should not form an impediment to the development of a 
nuanced ius in interregno. This is all the more important in light of the many failures associated to 
DIG.  
Efforts to resolve conflicts through internationally assisted DIG can fail, and have failed. Anno 2015, 
the disillusioning situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, for instance, testify to this177. 
This is not surprising because “[p]eace processes and transitions are often more unstable and insecure 
than even the preceding periods of conflict”178. This fragility especially characterizes transitions in 
anocracies where DIG is based on power-sharing, or indeed any context in which new state institutions 
are created: “[n]ascent state institutions may be unable to manage conflict, or conflict may be managed 
in repressive ways. The result could be the collapse of a peace agreement, the failure of state 
institutions, or a more violent resolution of disputes”179. Creating transitional governance structures 
against the backdrop of political competition unsurprisingly constitutes a recipe for failure.  
It is precisely because several transitions end up in disasters that the formulation of a ius in interregno 
is so timely. Law in a world without crisis or failure is devoid of much of its utility. Here the opposite 
applies. By offering more legal foreseeability, a ius in interregno would allow us to clarify the legal 
framework de lege lata that applies to external actors involved in DIG, which in turn may decrease the 
                                                      
174 See the ‘London 11 Final Communiqué’, available on http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013 
/10/20131022284999.html#axzz2l2Mk2dgB. Emphasis added. The London 11 consists of: Egypt, France, Germany, 
Italy, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. See also below, under chapter 5.  
175 K. Annan, N. Mousavizadeh, Interventions – A Life in War and Peace, op. cit., p. 352. 
176 Conference Conclusions of the International Afghanistan Conference entitled ‘Afghanistan and the international 
community: from transition to the transformation decade’, A/66/597–S/2011/762 dd. 9 December 2011, p. 4, § 12. This 
part of the conclusions concentrates on security issues.  
177 Pack is only one among many commentators observing that “[s]ince the Arab Spring began four years ago whole swatches 
of the Middle East have been transformed from authoritarian police states into ungoverned, and ungovernable, spaces”. J. 
Pack, ‘How to end Libya’s war’, International New York Times, 22 January 2015.  
178 Id.  
179 C. L. Sriram, M.-J. Zahar, ‘The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond’ in Africa Spectrum, 44, 3, 11-39. 
http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/viewFile/190/190%5C 
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risk of failure. To this end, it is crucial that a ius in interregno be critical towards the overstretch of the 
assistance model (sometimes amounting to proxy interim governance) and the artificial insistence on 
domestic responsibility for internationally assisted transitions. In sum, a ius in interregno should 
deconstruct the tension between international power and domestic responsibility at the occasion of 
DIG.  
Conclusion  
Supported by the peace-through-transition paradigm, DIG has been increasingly advocated both as a 
preventive and curative measure to confront threats to international peace and security. DIG has 
arguably become a center piece of the international collective security system. This paper argues that, 
in light of its relevance and frequency today, DIG and its ideological basis –the peace-through-
transition paradigm– should be deconstructed from an international legal perspective, too. A ius in 
interregno should be particularly attentive to (i) the multifaceted nature of the internationalization of 
DIG and (ii) the prima facie legal reasons prayed in aid of its success.  
First, a ius in interregno should take into account when in the transition process, which actors 
(purportedly) influence the transition, and how they exercise this leverage, considering that the 
reconstitutionalization of a state concerns the core of its domaine réservé. Second, a ius in interregno 
should critically engage with three propositions that may be invoked by organizations, states and 
contact groups to justify their recourse to DIG: (a) because of the domestic nature of DIG, any legal 
assessment of international assistance in light of the principles of state sovereignty and self-
determination would be redundant; (b) unrestricted by any order-preserving international legal 
instruments, transitional authorities or third states/organizations could act legibus soluti when 
contributing to the reconstitutionalization of states in transition; and (c) domestic transitional 
authorities would systematically bear responsibility for DIG.  
A critical analysis of DIG should not be left in the hands of political science alone. A ius in interregno 
should also tackle this issue. A ius in interregno would lie at the intersection of comparative 
constitutional law and international law, and needs to be distinguished from ius post bellum180 or lex 
pacificatoria181 (as, in a nutshell, it should not be dependent on the qualification of armed conflict 
resp. the existence of peace agreements). A refined legal model for analyzing internationalized interim 
governance is almost overdue because DIG is recurrent today, and likely to be repeated in the future. 
Furthermore, the many actors involved with DIG will benefit from a clearer legal framework, 
especially given the significant budgets allocated to the assistance to DIG. Assistance to DIG may be 
less costly than ITA, it is not, of course, completely free. It is clear that “the international community 
continues to allocate vast resources to support interim regimes within peace-building programmes”182. 
The international involvement with DIG requires financial commitments by the so-called international 
community on the basis of aid agreements, conditionality programs or donations. The UNSC has 
underscored that peacebuilding in transition states requires sustained financial support183. This 
translates into considerable sums, also committed bilaterally, e.g. the $875 million provided by the US 
                                                      
180 C. Stahn, J. K. Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum: Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, Springer Verlag, 2008. 
181 C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria, OUP Oxford, 2008. 
182 J. Strasheim and H. Fjelde, 'Pre-Designing Democracy: Institutional Design of Interim Governments and Democratization 
in 15 Post-Conflict Societies', Democratization 21, no. 2, 24 December 2012, p. 336.  
183 “The Security Council underscores that peacebuilding, in particular, institution building, the extension of State authority 
and the re-establishment of core public administration functions, requires sustained international and national attention, 
and financial and technical support in order to effectively build and sustain peace in countries emerging from conflict. 
The Security Council recognizes that the gaps in the provision of rapid and sustained financial support continue to 
hamper peacebuilding efforts. The Security Council welcomes the role played by the United Nations’ Peacebuilding 
Fund in filling these gaps and urges Member States to contribute to the Fund and other relevant multi-donor trust funds 
that support countries emerging from conflict in order to replenish them”, S/PRST/2015/2 dd. 14 January 2015.  
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to Yemen since the (failed) transition began in November 2011184, to give only one random example. 
In short, as one delegation put it at a UNSC debate, “[t]he international community has an important 
role to play in providing financial and technical support to transitional Governments”185.  
This paper leaves the analysis of the financial repercussions of (international assistance to) DIG for 
another day. Also left for another occasion is the deeper analysis of the nature, contents and normative 
value of ius in interregno – an analysis to be anchored in international law de lege lata as applicable to 
DIG. By expressing a couple of caveas, this paper has taken an initial step in this regard, and 
encourages further thinking about how DIG can be analyzed from an international legal perspective. A 
number of traps should hereby be avoided: DIG is more complex and paradoxical than might seem at 
first sight. A nuanced ius in interregno should take this into account, and should consider that the 
following and final proposition is unlikely to be devoid of legal significance. The manner in which 
states in transition enjoy international assistance will influence in which direction the pendulum is 
swinging: multilateral state transformation or unilateral constitutional geopolitics.  
 
 
                                                      
184 “As ISIL and other regional crises continue to demand our attention, it is more important than ever that we don’t lose sight 
of what’s at stake in Yemen. It’s more important than ever that we continue to support the Yemeni people and the 
Yemeni government during this very fragile moment. And it’s more important than ever that we sustain practical, unified, 
and coordinated support. Over the past two months alone, the United States has provided over $160 million in additional 
economic and humanitarian support, bringing our total assistance since the transition began in November 2011 to $875 
million”, Remarks at the Friends of Yemen Ministerial, 24 September 2014, available on 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/232128.htm.  
185 The Egyptian delegation added that such support must continue for elected governments after the transition, and that the 
aim of the support was to establish “the necessary frameworks to provide for all of these elements, including special 
tribunals, truth commissions, information strategies to enable individuals and groups to recover from the conflict and 
move to a phase of peaceful coexistence, and effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes” 
(S/PV.4903 (Resumption 1) dd. 26 January 2004 p. 9).  
  
 
